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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Indigenous movements have become increasingly powerful
in the last couple of decades and they are now important
political actors in some South American countries, such as
Bolivia, Ecuador, and, to a lesser extent, Peru and Chile. The
rise of indigenous movements has provoked concern among
U.S. policymakers and other observers who have feared that
these movements will exacerbate ethnic polarization,
undermine democracy, and jeopardize U.S. interests in the
region. This paper argues that concern over the rise of
indigenous movements is greatly exaggerated. It maintains
that the rise of indigenous movements has not brought about
a marked increase in ethnic polarization in the region
because most indigenous organizations have been ethnically
inclusive and have eschewed violence. Although the
indigenous movements have at times demonstrated a lack of
regard for democratic institutions and procedures, they have
also helped deepen democracy in the Andean region by
promoting greater political inclusion and participation and by
aggressively combating ethnic discrimination and inequality.
Finally, this study suggests that the indigenous population
has opposed some U.S.-sponsored initiatives, such as coca
eradication and market reform, for legitimate reasons. Such
policies have had some negative environmental, cultural, and
economic consequences for indigenous people, which U.S.
policymakers should try to address. The conclusion provides
some specific policy recommendations on how to go about
this.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S POLICYMAKERS
The U.S. should try to engage indigenous movements in
Latin America, rather than marginalize them. It should
dialogue more frequently with the current generation of
indigenous leaders and it should seek to educate and build
ties to the next generation. The U.S. should also identify
common areas of interest and work with indigenous
movements to advance them. For example, the U.S. should
support the indigenous movement‟s efforts to address
inequality and discrimination and to promote indigenous
political participation and representation. At the same time,
however, the United States needs to continue to take a stand
against policies or actions by indigenous leaders that
undermine democracy.
Policymakers should also take steps to ensure that U.S.sponsored free market policies help, rather than hurt, the
indigenous population. The United States should help create
social programs designed to compensate for cuts in social
spending and enable the indigenous population to compete
more effectively in the market economy. Such programs
could provide training and credit to indigenous farmers and
entrepreneurs as well as seek to improve local health and
education systems. The U.S. should also ensure that U.S.
mining, forestry, and agricultural companies clean up the
environmental damage caused by their activities and
minimize such damage in the future.
In addition, the U.S. should reorient its counternarcotics
policy in several ways. First, the U.S. should acknowledge
that there are legitimate, traditional uses of coca and it
should work with Andean governments to limit coca farming
to the amounts necessary to supply those traditional uses.
Second, the U.S. should shift its focus away from coca
eradication and devote more resources to encouraging
indigenous farmers to grow alternative crops. Finally, the
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U.S. needs to do more to reduce the market for illegal drugs,
such as cocaine, in the United States.
INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS, DEMOCRACY, AND U.S.
INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA
Indigenous movements are increasingly important political
actors in South America. From Colombia to Chile,
indigenous organizations have emerged in recent years to
contest elections, carry out protests, and make policy
demands. Some observers have argued that these indigenous
movements represent a real threat to U.S. interests in the
region. They point out that indigenous organizations have
opposed various U.S.-sponsored initiatives in Latin America
from free-market policies to coca eradication. Moreover,
according to many of these skeptics, indigenous movements
will exacerbate ethnic polarization and undermine
democracy in the region.
This paper argues that concern over the rise of indigenous
movements is greatly exaggerated. It suggests that the
indigenous population has valid reasons to oppose some
U.S.-sponsored initiatives, such as coca eradication and
market reform. Indigenous movements have resisted marketoriented policies in large part because such policies have
failed to bring significant benefits to indigenous areas and at
times have had negative environmental and economic
consequences. They have opposed coca eradication,
meanwhile, because coca is a traditional part of indigenous
culture and coca growing has provided a livelihood for many
indigenous peasants. As I discuss in the Conclusion, there
are a number of steps U.S. policymakers could and should
take to address these concerns.
This paper also argues that the rise of indigenous movements
has not brought about a marked increase in ethnic
polarization in the region because most indigenous
organizations have been ethnically inclusive and have
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eschewed violence. The rise of indigenous movements has
had some negative consequences on democracy, however.
Indigenous leaders and movements sometimes have
demonstrated a lack of regard for institutions of liberal
democracy and they have participated in protests that have
led to the removal of democratically elected presidents in
Bolivia and Ecuador. Yet at the same time, the indigenous
movements have helped deepen democracy in the Andean
region by promoting greater political inclusion and
participation and by aggressively combating ethnic
discrimination and inequality. Thus, the overall effect of the
rise of indigenous movements on democracy is mixed.
This paper is organized as follows. The first section
discusses the rise of indigenous movements in the region,
focusing on Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. The second
section explores why indigenous organizations have opposed
U.S.-sponsored coca eradication and market-oriented
policies in the region. The third section examines what
impact these movements have had on democracy and ethnic
polarization in the region. The conclusion offers some
recommendations as to how U.S. policymakers should deal
with the indigenous movements.
THE RISE OF INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS
Indigenous people represent a significant portion of the
population in Latin America. According to recent census
data on ethnic self-identification, indigenous people
represent 62 percent of the population in Bolivia, 42 percent
in Guatemala, 27 percent of the population in Peru, 6 percent
of the population in Ecuador and 4 percent in Chile (Layton
and Patrinos 2006). Nevertheless, the indigenous population
traditionally played little role in politics in the region. Not
only did the indigenous population typically lack its own
parties, but it had little representation in the main parties and
political institutions in the region.
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In the last two decades, that has begun to change. Powerful
indigenous movements and parties have emerged in some
countries in the region and indigenous people have gained
increasing representation in these countries‟ main political
institutions (Lucero 2008; Madrid 2008; Van Cott 2005;
Yashar 2005). The indigenous movement is currently
strongest in Bolivia where indigenous people currently have
a significant presence at all levels of government, but
Ecuador and, to a lesser extent, Chile and Peru, also have
active indigenous movements.
Bolivia has had important indigenous organizations since the
1970s when an independent political movement known as
the Kataristas emerged among the Aymara population.
During the late 1970s, the Katarista movement founded a
national indigenous confederation, the Confederación
Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia
(CSUTCB), and carried out protests that helped pave the
way for the return to democracy in the country. After the
return to democracy, coca grower unions that were
composed mostly of Quechua-speaking peasants gradually
took over the CSUTCB. Under their leadership, the
CSUTCB became increasingly militant, carrying out a wave
of protests and marches. In 1995, at the instigation of the
coca growers, the CSUTCB, along with a confederation of
peasant colonists, the Confederación Sindical de
Colonizadores de Bolivia (CSCB), and a women‟s peasant
federation, Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas
Indígenas Bartolina Sisa, founded an indigenous party, the
Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP). The ASP
did not initially fare well in elections outside of its base in
the coca growing areas of rural Cochabamba, and in 1998 it
split up because of divisions among its leadership. One of its
leaders, Evo Morales, then founded a new party, the
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), by borrowing the
registration of a largely defunct left-wing party. Under
Morales‟ leadership, the MAS expanded its base, reaching
out to indigenous and mestizo leaders and organizations
5

throughout the country. Morales and the MAS finished a
surprising second in the 2002 elections and then captured the
presidency in 2005. Morales was reelected in 2009 by a large
margin.
The ascent of Morales and the MAS has increased the
political influence of the indigenous movement in Bolivia
considerably. Numerous indigenous leaders have been
elected to local and national level offices, while others have
been appointed to important governmental posts. Morales
and the other leaders of the MAS also consult regularly with
indigenous leaders and organizations through party
assemblies and congresses as well as through a governmental
advisory body known as the National Coordinator for
Change (CONALCAM). Most indigenous organizations in
Bolivia have supported the government and have reaped
benefits from doing so. However, some indigenous leaders
and organizations, such as the Amazonian indigenous
confederation, the Confederación Indígena del Oriente y
Amazonia Boliviano (CIDOB), and an association of
traditional highlands governing bodies, the Consejo Nacional
de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), have had
fallings out with the government or have opted to maintain
their independence from it.
Ecuador also has a relatively strong indigenous movement.
The largest indigenous confederation in Ecuador, the
Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador
(CONAIE), first emerged in the late 1980s and carried out a
number of highly successful protests during the 1990s. In the
mid-1990s, CONAIE helped found an indigenous-based
political party, Pachakutik, which won a significant number
of mayoral and legislative positions in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, and helped elect Lucio Gutiérrez president in
2002. In the last five years, however, the influence of
CONAIE and Pachakutik has been on the wane. Pachakutik
fared rather poorly in elections in 2006 and 2009, and
CONAIE has had less success in mobilizing people in
6

protests. Moreover, both CONAIE and Pachakutik have had
a frosty relationship with the current Ecuadorian president,
Rafael Correa. Some other indigenous organizations,
meanwhile, have sought to challenge CONAIE‟s
preeminence in the indigenous movement, including an
evangelical indigenous federation, the Federación
Ecuatoriana de Iglesias Evangélicas (FEINE), and the
Federación Nacional de Organizations Campesinas,
Indígenas, y Negras (FENOCIN), a leftist federation of
indigenous and black organizations. Neither of these
organizations commands the support of nearly as many
indigenous people and communities as CONAIE, but they
have had more influence with recent governments.
The indigenous movement in Peru is considerably weaker
than the Bolivian and Ecuadorian movements. There are
some strong organizations in the Peruvian Amazonian,
notably the Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva
Peruana (AIDESEP), and the Confederación de
Nacionalidades Amazónicas del Perú (CONAP), but the vast
majority of the Peruvian indigenous population lives in the
highlands where indigenous organizations are weak and
fragmented. The two traditional organizations of highlands
peasants, the Confederación Campesina del Peru (CCP) and
the Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA) were both
severely weakened by the guerrilla war that ravaged the
highlands in the 1980s and early 1990s. The Shining Path
targeted many peasant organizers for assassination and the
violence made it difficult for organizations in the highlands
to engage in political activity. Neither of these organizations
has recovered since that time. They have relatively few
members and their main affiliates are based far from the
country‟s capital and main center of power. The most
influential indigenous organization in the highlands in recent
years has been an organization that sprang up to protest the
negative environmental effects of mining in largely
indigenous communities, the Confederación Nacional de
Comunidades del Perú Afectados por la Minería
7

(CONACAMI). Nevertheless, even this organization has
limited ability to mobilize people or shape national policies.
Chile has the weakest indigenous movement of the four
countries, but one that has become increasingly active in
recent years. Chile‟s indigenous movement is concentrated
in the southern part of the country where the Mapuche
population lives. The movement is relatively fragmented,
however, and no single organization commands the
allegiance of most Mapuche people. One of the most militant
organizations is the Consejo de Todas las Tierras, an
organization formed in 1991, which has carried out
numerous protests and occupations to demand land rights
and political autonomy for the Mapuche in Chile.
Nevertheless, the Consejo de Todas las Tierras has not
demonstrated an ability to mobilize large numbers of people
and it has alienated the main political parties and actors in
Chile. Other organizations have close ties to the main
political parties, but these organizations have yet to
demonstrate that they have appreciable support within the
Mapuche population.
U.S. INITIATIVES IN THE REGION
Indigenous movements in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru
have vigorously opposed some U.S. policy initiatives in the
region, including free market reform. Over the last several
decades, Latin American countries have implemented a
variety of free market reforms, privatizing numerous stateowned companies and opening up their economies to foreign
trade and investment. Chile, which initiated its reforms in the
mid-1970s, has gone the furthest in terms of implementing
these policies, but Bolivia, Peru, and, to a lesser extent,
Ecuador also enacted important measures beginning in the
late 1980s or early 1990s. The U.S. has strongly encouraged
Latin American countries to enact these policies, providing
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aid, debt refinancing, and other benefits to countries that
implement the free market reforms.
The reforms have brought a number of benefits. They have
helped Latin American countries conquer hyperinflation,
they have generated increased financial flows to the region,
and they have given Latin American consumers access to a
broad range of, often inexpensive, foreign made products.
The reforms have generated uneven growth over time and
within countries, however, and the policies have actually had
a negative impact on many indigenous communities.
Indigenous peasant farmers have had a hard time competing
with the agricultural imports that flooded Latin American
markets when their governments reduced tariff barriers.
Indigenous people have also been hard hit by cuts in
government social spending that have accompanied the
neoliberal reforms. The removal of restrictions on foreign
investment, meanwhile, has led many foreign companies to
establish mining, oil exploration, forestry, and agricultural
concerns on traditionally indigenous lands. Indigenous
people have complained that these companies have often
caused environmental damage and brought few benefits to
the indigenous communities located in these areas.
As the 1990s wore on, indigenous people mounted an
increasing number of protests against the neoliberal policies
and their effects. In Ecuador, for example, the indigenous
movement first came to prominence in the 1990s because of
the massive marches, roadblocks, and demonstrations they
carried out to protest market-oriented policies implemented
by the Rodrigo Borja, Sixto Durán Ballén, and Abdalá
Bucaram administrations in Ecuador. During this period, the
Ecuadorian indigenous movement came to be known as the
leading opponent of neoliberal policies in the country (Ibarra
2002, 28). In Bolivia as well, the indigenous movement
spearheaded the opposition to free market policies beginning
in the 1990s. The Bolivian indigenous movement was
particularly critical of trade liberalization, the privatization
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of natural resource companies, and a proposal to export
natural gas through Chile. In Peru and Chile, the indigenous
movement has not played a central role in the struggle
against free market policies, but they have carried out
protests against them. Moreover, in both countries, the
indigenous movement has aggressively opposed policies that
have opened up indigenous areas for mining and forestry
activities by multinational companies.
Indigenous movements in Bolivia and Peru have also
vigorously opposed U.S-sponsored coca eradication efforts.
The U.S. has been extensively involved in coca eradication
programs in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru where much of the
world‟s supply of coca is grown. These programs have met
particularly strong resistance in Bolivia where the unions of
coca growers are quite powerful and wield a great deal of
authority within the indigenous movement. Indigenous
organizations in Peru have also opposed coca eradication,
but the coca growers in Peru have less influence in the
Peruvian indigenous movement. As a result, the Peruvian
indigenous movement has not made an end to coca
eradication one of its principal demands.
Coca growers in both countries have held numerous protests
and marches in efforts to block eradication efforts. In Peru,
for example, the coca growers held a 16 day march in 2003
that involved more than 8,000 participants (Cabieses 2004,
11). President Toledo eventually met with the marchers after
they arrived in Lima and agreed to some of their demands,
declaring that “all of you, producers of coca—you are not
narcotraffickers” (Cabieses 2004, 12). The coca grower
unions have also sought to gain influence through the
electoral process. Leaders of the coca growers have won
numerous mayoralties in coca growing regions in the
Department of Ayacucho and they also elected
representatives to the national legislature and the Andean
Parliament in 2006 (Huber 2008).
10

Coca growers have gained even more influence in Bolivia. In
Bolivia, coca growing expanded dramatically beginning in
the 1980s when many Quechua-speaking Bolivians migrated
to the sub-tropical areas of Cochabamba in search of work.
The coca growers formed strong unions, which used
roadblocks, marches, and other protests to resist U.S.sponsored coca eradication policies. As we have seen, these
coca grower unions helped create an indigenous-based
political party, and eventually managed to get their leader,
Evo Morales, elected as president of Bolivia. After taking
office, Morales expanded the amount of coca that Bolivians
were allowed to grow legally in the country. Under Morales,
the Bolivian government has continued to eradicate coca
grown outside of the legally protected areas and narcotics
seizures have actually increased in recent years.
Nevertheless, the U.S has repeatedly accused Morales of
failing to do enough to fight narco-trafficking and in late
2008 it suspended trade preferences it had granted Bolivia
under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication
Act (ATPDEA). Morales retaliated by expelling the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Agency from the country.
Indigenous movements in the Andes have opposed coca
eradication in part because coca is a traditional part of
indigenous culture in the region. Coca leaf, which is a mild
stimulant, has been chewed by indigenous inhabitants of the
Andes for thousands of years (Lloréns 2004). It is also used
to prepare coca leaf tea, or mate de coca, and it is employed
in various traditional medicines. In Peru, a 2003 survey
found that approximately three million Peruvians, or fifteen
percent of the population, chew coca leaf, and another
million Peruvians also use the coca leaf to prepare coca leaf
tea (Rospigliosi 2004, 13-4). Indigenous people constitute
about three-quarters of the people who chew coca leaves in
Peru, but coca leaf tea is consumed by all sectors of society
in Peru (Rospigliosi 2004, 39). The percentage of coca leaf
chewers among the total population is probably even greater
in Bolivia, although precise figures were not available. In
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both Bolivia and Peru, however, the amount of coca grown
significantly exceeds the quantity consumed in traditional
ways and this surplus makes its way into the hands of narcotraffickers.
The indigenous movement has also opposed coca eradication
programs because of the negative health and environmental
consequences of aerial spraying of coca crops and the
violence that has been associated with some coca eradication
efforts. Nevertheless, the main reason that indigenous
movements have opposed coca eradication is because coca
growing is an important source of income for many
indigenous people. In Peru, some 50,000 people were
estimated to work in the coca industry in 2004, and the
number has certainly grown since that time because the
number of hectares of coca under cultivation has steadily
increased in recent years (Cabieses 2004, 12; McClintock
and Vallas 2010, 207). The number of coca growers in
Bolivia is also quite large. By the early 1990s, there were
more than 40,000 coca growers in Cochabamba alone and
the number has continued to expand since that time, both in
Cochabamba and in other departments, such as La Paz
(Healy 1991, 88-9). Although most coca growers in Bolivia
and Peru are not wealthy by any standard, they earn
considerably more from coca growing than they could from
other available forms of employment.
The indigenous movement thus has valid reasons to be
concerned about both coca eradication and free market
reform. Both policies have had some negative economic,
environmental, and health consequences for indigenous
people and they have undermined traditional indigenous
customs. The indigenous movement has viewed these
policies as being imposed on their countries by the United
States and other foreign interests, which has exacerbated
anti-American attitudes among the movement‟s leaders. It is
therefore in the interest of the United States to address these
12

concerns,
and
the
conclusion
provides
recommendations about how the U.S. might do this.

some

IMPACT ON ETHNIC POLARIZATION & DEMOCRACY
Some observers have expected the rise of indigenous
movements to have a very negative impact on ethnic
polarization and democracy in Latin America. National
security analysts in Washington have argued that indigenous
movements promote radicalism and ethnic separatism ("A
political awakening” 2004, 37; Madrid 2005; Oppenheimer
2003, 16A). Many Latin Americans have also been
concerned. In Chile, for example, prominent politicians have
accused the Mapuche movement of promoting separatism
and disrespect for the rule of law (Haughney 2006, 72).
In addition, an extensive scholarly literature has linked the
rise of ethnic movements and parties to ethnic conflict and
the breakdown of democracy. According to this literature,
ethnic parties often engage in outbidding—that is, they seek
to woo support among members of their own ethnic group by
demonizing members of other ethnic groups and demanding
policies that favor members of their own ethnic group
(Horowitz 1985; Reilly 2001; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972;
Sisk 1996). This worsens ethnic tensions and often leads to
conflict. Reilly (2001, 9) warns that the consequences of
ethnic outbidding “can be devastating: moderate forces are
quickly overwhelmed by more extreme voices, leading to an
ongoing cycle of violence and retribution.” Rabushka and
Shepsle (1972, 85), meanwhile, suggest that “as ethnicity
becomes increasingly salient, every political decision favors
one community and hinders others.” Ethnic groups that are
out of power may use violence to try to achieve their aims or
improve their bargaining position, whereas ethnic groups
that are in power may employ force to repress them.
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Much of this literature, however, assumes that the
boundaries between ethnic groups are relatively clear and
stable and that individuals will only support the parties and
movements that are created to represent their group (Chandra
2001, 2005). As a result, ethnic parties and movements have
incentives to use exclusionary appeals to court members of
their own ethnic group, rather than reaching out to members
of other ethnic groups through inclusive appeals. In Latin
America, however, mestizaje or racial mixing has blurred the
boundaries between members of different ethnic groups and
reduced ethnic polarization. In surveys many people identify
with more than one ethnic group or express fluid, mixed, or
ambivalent ethnic loyalties. For example, many people who
self-identify as mestizo on some surveys identify with some
indigenous category on others. These mestizos often appear
indigenous, maintain traditional indigenous customs, and
sympathize with some traditional demands of the indigenous
movement. Moreover, even many whites sympathize with
some indigenous demands. Indigenous movements in Latin
America thus have incentives to avoid exclusionary behavior
and to woo the support of whites and mestizos.
In fact, indigenous movements in Latin America have
reached out to members of other ethnic groups. They have
largely eschewed exclusionary rhetoric and actions, they
have formed numerous alliances with non-indigenous groups
and leaders, and they have embraced a variety of non-ethnic
causes and demands. The indigenous movement in Ecuador,
for example, came together with various non-indigenous
organizations and leaders to create Pachakutik in the mid1990s. Pachakutik has developed a broad and inclusive
platform, it has recruited many whites and mestizos as
candidates, and it has forged alliances with non-indigenous
parties and endorsed non-indigenous presidential candidates.
The Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia has been similarly
ethnically inclusive. Indeed, Bolivia‟s vice president and
approximately half of the MAS‟s legislators are nonindigenous and the MAS has maintained numerous alliances
14

with white and mestizo-dominated parties and organizations.
The leaders of these parties have preached ethnic tolerance
and emphasized that they do not represent indigenous people
alone.
As a result, the rise of indigenous movements in the Andes
has not led to a dramatic increase in ethnic polarization in the
region. Inter-ethnic relations in the region continue to be
friendly for the most part, although discrimination against
indigenous people and Afro-Latinos is commonplace. There
has been a notable increase in polarization in Bolivia during
the Morales administration, but the polarization is more
political than ethnic in nature. Moreover, ethnically-related
violence in the region is still quite rare. Indigenous groups
have organized numerous illegal protests, including
roadblocks and the occupation of land and buildings. In
Chile, indigenous groups have even been accused of setting
fire to buildings and lands. As a result, there have been
numerous confrontations between indigenous protesters and
the police or military in the Andean nations. Some of these
have turned violent, such as a 2008 confrontation in the
Peruvian Amazon. There have been few incidents of intercommunal violence, however, and indigenous leaders have
typically foresworn the use of arms. Some guerrilla
movements, such as the Shining Path in Peru, have recruited
numerous indigenous foot soldiers, but these have been not
been indigenous-led movements, and they typically have not
embraced ethnic demands. The few indigenous-led armed
movements that have emerged in the region, such as the
Ejército Guerrillero Túpac Katari in Bolivia, have not
obtained a significant following among indigenous people
and have disappeared.
The indigenous movements have undermined democracy in
other ways, however. Indigenous organizations have
participated in various protests that have brought about the
overthrow of elected leaders. CONAIE, for example,
spearheaded non-violent protests in Ecuador that led to the
15

removal of President Abdalá Bucaram in 1996 and Jamil
Mahuad in 2000. In the latter case, the indigenous
movement‟s occupation of government buildings caused
Mahuad to flee the presidential palace and led to the creation
of a ruling triumvirate that included the head of CONAIE,
Antonio Vargas, as a well as a member of the Supreme Court
and the military. This triumvirate lasted only a short time,
however, before the military insisted on handing power over
to the country‟s vice president. Indigenous protests also led
Bolivian presidents Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Carlos
Mesa to step down. Sánchez de Lozada resigned under
pressure in 2003 after his efforts to repress the protests led to
the deaths of more than 60 protestors. His vice president,
Carlos Mesa, then took over as president, but Mesa only
governed for a year and a half before he too had to step down
in the face of indigenous protests.
Indigenous movements have also weakened democracy in
Bolivia through their participation in the Morales
administration. The government of Morales has undermined
horizontal accountability through various measures,
including packing the judiciary and other traditionally nonpartisan institutions with his supporters. It has also reformed
the constitution to expand the powers of the president and
permit Morales to run for a second term. In addition, the
Morales administration has undermined the rule of law by
using mass mobilizations to intimidate the opposition.
Supporters of Morales, for example, carried out protests to
put pressure on the opposition to pass the constitutional
reform and the agrarian reform law as well as to intimidate
opposition prefects into resigning. The Morales
administration has also filed criminal charges against leading
members of the opposition, including former presidents,
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Carlos Mesa, Eduardo
Rodríguez Veltze, and Jorge Quiroga, as well as current or
former opposition governors, Manfred Reyes Villa, Leonel
Fernández, Rubén Costas, and Mario Cossio. Many of these
prosecutions appear to be politically inspired.
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Although the Morales administration does not represent the
indigenous movement per se, Morales is the most prominent
indigenous leader in Bolivia and most of the indigenous
movement has supported and even facilitated his actions.
Bolivian indigenous organizations, for example, participated
in protests designed to intimidate opposition. Thus, the
indigenous movement in Bolivia should be held partly
responsible for the violations of democratic principles that
have occurred under the Morales administration.
The rise of indigenous movements in Latin America has also
helped deepen democracy in some ways, however. First, the
indigenous movements have helped the indigenous
population gain greater political representation. Indigenous
people traditionally had very little political influence in Latin
America. The major political parties in the region typically
did not recruit indigenous leaders as candidates for important
elected offices, nor did they often name indigenous people to
important positions within the government or the party
hierarchy. As a result, very few indigenous people served in
positions of authority in the Andean nations prior to the
1990s. The rise of indigenous movements and, especially,
indigenous parties changed all that. The indigenous parties
have helped numerous indigenous people get elected as
councilors, mayors, legislators, governors, and even
president, in the case of Bolivia. Bolivia‟s new constitution
also sets aside seats in the legislature and on the electoral
tribunals for people of indigenous-peasant origin. In
addition, indigenous people have been appointed to
important ministerial positions in recent years. In Ecuador,
for example, President Gutiérrez named indigenous people to
the top positions in four ministries, including the Ministry of
Foreign Relations and the Ministry of Agriculture.
Indigenous people have also held a number of important
ministries in Bolivia in recent years, including the Ministry
of Foreign Relations and the Ministry of Justice. Indigenous
people have made fewer inroads in Chile and Peru in large
part because these countries have no major indigenous
17

parties and their indigenous movements are considerably
weaker than in Bolivia and Ecuador. Nevertheless, the
number of judges, prosecutors, mayors and legislators with
indigenous last names has risen steadily in Peru in recent
years, although they still represent a small proportion of the
total (Paredes 2008, 12-3). Thus, the indigenous movement
has helped deepen democracy in Latin America by
promoting greater descriptive representation and political
inclusion.
The rise of indigenous movements has also helped increase
political participation among indigenous people in the
region. Voter turnout was traditionally lower in indigenous
areas than in non-indigenous areas of the Andes in part
because indigenous people had higher illiteracy rates, often
lacked identity documents, and lived in more isolated areas.
The failure of the main parties to recruit indigenous
candidates or address indigenous demands may also have
suppressed voter turnout in indigenous areas. The emergence
of powerful indigenous parties and movements helped
change this situation in Bolivia and Ecuador, however. The
indigenous parties generated more enthusiasm for voting by
running indigenous candidates and embracing traditional
indigenous demands. They also pushed for the provision of
free identity cards, the translation of electoral materials into
indigenous languages, and the establishment of more voting
centers in rural, highly indigenous areas. As a result, the
turnout rate is now typically higher in indigenous areas than
in non-indigenous areas of Bolivia and Ecuador (Madrid
2005).
In Bolivia, the rise of the indigenous movement and,
specifically, the election of Evo Morales as president have
also helped boost satisfaction with democracy among
indigenous people (Madrid 2010). Before 2005, Bolivia had
one of the lowest levels of satisfaction with democracy in the
hemisphere and democratic satisfaction was particularly low
among indigenous people. After the election of Evo
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Morales, however, satisfaction with democracy in Bolivia
began to increase. Surveys by the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP) found that in 2008 65 percent of
self-identified indigenous people reported being satisfied or
very satisfied with democracy, up from 49 percent in 2004.1
By contrast, only 48 percent of whites and mestizos reported
being satisfied or very satisfied with democracy in 2008,
which was slightly lower than in 2004. The percentage of
indigenous Bolivians who believe that their country is
democratic also rose considerably in the wake of Morales‟
election. According to LAPOP surveys, 66 percent of selfidentified indigenous people classified Bolivia as somewhat
or very democratic in 2008, up from 51 percent in 2004. By
contrast, only 60 percent of mestizos and whites categorized
Bolivia as somewhat or very democratic in 2008, the same
percentage as in 2004. Mass level evaluations of and
satisfaction with democracy have also increased in Ecuador
in recent years, but the timing of it appears unrelated to the
rise of indigenous movement in that country. Moreover, the
increase has not been higher among indigenous people than
among whites and mestizos in Ecuador.
Finally, the rise of the indigenous movements in the Andes
has also helped deepen democracy in the Andes by reducing
ethnic discrimination and inequality. The indigenous
population has traditionally suffered from a great deal of
social discrimination, and it lags behind the non-indigenous
population on many socio-economic indicators including
income, life expectancy, education, and access to health care
and housing. Indigenous movements have lobbied hard for
the government to implement policies to combat
discrimination and to close these gaps. They have had the
most success to date in Bolivia where the Morales
administration has moved aggressively to address indigenous
1

These data represent the author‟s original analyses of LAPOP survey
data. For more information on LAPOP surveys, see:
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/
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poverty and exclusion. Under Morales, the Bolivian
government has tightened laws against racial discrimination
and it has sought to enhance respect for indigenous culture
through the teaching of indigenous languages and history in
the public school system. Bolivia‟s new constitution also
grants various collective rights to the indigenous population,
including the right to self-governance and territorial
autonomy and the right to use traditional forms of justice. In
addition, the Morales administration has enacted laws that
should disproportionately benefit the indigenous population,
including literacy programs, a major agrarian reform
program, and conditional cash transfer schemes. These
measures appear to have brought some benefits already,
since illiteracy, infant mortality, and extreme poverty have
all declined under the Morales administration and the rural
poor‟s share of national income has increased (Movimiento
al Socialismo 2009).
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper has argued that the rise of indigenous movements
in Latin America has not had the negative effects that many
policymakers and observers expected. The indigenous
movement has opposed some U.S. initiatives in Latin
America, but this opposition has been grounded in valid
concerns and U.S. (and Latin American) policymakers
should take these concerns into account in crafting policies
toward the region. To begin with, policymakers should take
steps to see that the indigenous population benefits from
market-oriented policies, rather than being hurt by them.
Latin American governments with the assistance of the
United States should create social programs designed
specifically to help the indigenous population compete in the
market economy and to compensate for cuts in social
spending that have negatively affected indigenous
communities. Such programs could provide training and
credit to indigenous farmers and entrepreneurs as well as
seek to improve local health and education systems. They
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might be funded in part by tax revenue generated from the
mining, forestry, and agricultural activities of corporations in
indigenous areas. Efforts should also be made to ensure that
these companies clean up the environmental damage caused
by their activities and minimize such damage in the future.
Latin American governments would need to be the instigator
of such policies but the U.S. can play an important role in
encouraging and supporting their implementation.
The U.S. should also reorient its counternarcotics policy in
several ways. First, the U.S. must acknowledge that there are
legitimate, traditional uses of coca and it should work with
Andean governments to limit coca farming to the amounts
necessary to supply those traditional uses. Second, the U.S.
policy should shift its focus away from eradication, which is
a politically controversial policy that has created a great deal
of anti-American sentiment without affecting the overall
supply of coca grown in the region. Instead, it should devote
more resources to encouraging peasant farmers to grow
alternative crops. Third, the U.S. needs to do more to reduce
the market for illegal drugs, such as cocaine, in the United
States. As some indigenous leaders have pointed out, the
U.S. has focused too much on eradicating the supply of
drugs and not enough on developing policies, such as drug
treatment programs, to stem the demand for drugs at home.
More generally, the U.S. should try to engage indigenous
movements in Latin America, rather than marginalize them.
It should dialogue frequently with indigenous leaders and
bring more of them to the United States for meetings and
conferences. It should also develop programs so that the next
generation of indigenous leaders might study in the United
States or at least gain greater familiarity with this country.
The U.S. should also support the indigenous movement‟s
efforts to address inequality and discrimination and to
promote
indigenous
political
participation
and
representation. At the same time, however, the United States
needs to continue to take a stand against policies or actions
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by indigenous leaders that weaken democracy or exacerbate
ethnic or political polarization. U.S. criticisms of the
excesses of indigenous movements will only be effective,
however, to the extent that the U.S. improves its ties to the
indigenous movements and demonstrates that it can be a
partner in the struggle against ethnic inequality in Latin
America.
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